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ABSTRACT The concept of identity has become one common research topic in security and privacy
where the real identity of users must be preserved, usually covered by pseudonym identifiers. With the
rise of Blockchain-based systems, identities are becoming even more critical than before, mainly due to
the immutability property. In fact, many publicly accessible Blockchain networks like Ethereum rely on
pseudonymization as a method for identifying subject actions. Pseudonyms are often employed to maintain
anonymity, but true anonymity requires unlinkability. Without this property, any attacker can examine the
messages sent by a specific pseudonym and learn new information about the holder of this pseudonym.
This use of Blockchain collides with regulations because of the right to be forgotten, and Blockchain-based
solutions are ensuring that every data stored within the chain will not be modified. In this paper we define
a method and a tool for dealing with digital identities within Blockchain environments that are compliant
with regulations. The proposed method provides a way to grant digital pseudo identities unlinked to the real
identity. This new method uses the benefits of key derivation systems to ensure a non-binding interaction
between users and the information model associated with their identity. The proposed method is demonstated
in the Ethereum context and illustrated with a case study.
INDEX TERMS Personally identifiable information, blockchain, ethereum, security management.
I. INTRODUCTION
During these last decades, Identity Management Sys-
tems (IdM) [1] have been studied and developed for man-
aging users’ identifiers across systems. IdM have inherent
flawns and complexities [2]. One of these flawns is to provide
trust, and these systems must ensure the management of iden-
tities. Literature reveals several reserch works in this sense.
For example, due to the increase of different interconnected
systems some solutions are provided as Federated Identity
Management Systems [3] or even for securing these federated
systems [4].
IdentityManagement is a controversial concept [5], mainly
because the different stakeholders have different views and
requirements about how identites should be managed. This
has resulted in quite a number of different approaches towards
providing identity management such as [2] where authors
provide guidelines about how to design a decentralized web
identity management system. In fact, these guidelines include
stakeholders’ motivation as well as their capabilities. They
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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also include the usability aspect as a key concept to achieve
wide acceptance. The term Personally Identifiable informa-
tion (PII) is defined in [6] as the information which can be
used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity. In this
IdM context, PII is a keystone concept [7] where stakeholders
and systems should carefully manage the information they
are processing. This information can be based on their name,
social security number, biometric records, among others, that
can be combined with other personal or identifying informa-
tion [7]. In fact, the loss of PII is a critical issue [8] not only
from a legal or regulatory point of view, where systems must
ensure the privacy of the data, but also from a personal point
of view where users can lose the control of their data [11].
The concept of identity has become one of the research
topics in security and privacy areas [2] where the real identity
of users must be preserved, and pseudo identities are created
and used [12]. The identity is defined as the qualities, beliefs,
personality, looks and/or expressions that make a person.
Thus, an identity is made up of identifiers and attributes
somehow linked to these identifiers. Since identifiers are
often the only connector to an identity, revealing such con-
nections is often target of attacks. There are methods not only
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for inferring personal information from obfuscated data, but
also for predicting the presence of private information such
as in emails [13]. Therefore stakeholders must carefully use
their data, even if they are not explicitly using their more
sensitive information. Pseudo identities are then created and
used setting hurdles and obstacles during the identification
process, such as Personally Identifiable Honeytokens [14].
With the rise of Blockchain-based systems, identities
are becoming more critical than before mainly due to its
immutability property. In fact, many publicly accessible
Blockchain networks like Ethereum rely on pseudonymiza-
tion as a method for identifying a subject. Pseudonyms are
often employed to maintain anonymity, but true anonymity
requires unlinkability [15]. Without this property, any
attacker can examine the messages sent by a specific
pseudonym and learn new information about the holder of
this pseudonym.
This is exactly what happens in Ethereum, where all
transactions are publicly auditable. This has serious impli-
cations in the decentralized applications (DApps) which use
Ethereum, because they generate a trace providing new infor-
mation about the identity of the users. In other words, they
break the non-binding requirement of true anonymity.
The European Union General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR) [9] and the California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA) [10] are regulations in laws on data protection and
privacy that address the processing, storage and transfer of
personal data. These regulation types promote the personal
privacy enhancement with terms like right to be forgotten and
right to delete personal information, what collides with the
immutability property obtained by using Blockchain-based
solutions and responsible for ensuring that every data stored
within the ledger will not be modified in the future.
The unlinkability of digital identities within Blockchain
environments is the key research of this paper, while being
compliant with regulations. The proposed method and tool
provide a means to grant pseudo identities to users that are
totally unrelated to their real identity. This method uses the
benefits of key derivation systems to ensure a non-binding
interaction between users and the information model associ-
ated with their identity. To demonstrate the feasibility of the
anonymity of user actions and the unlinkability of identifiers
the Ethereum context is great to demonstrate the method
versus the current use of pseudonymous identities.
Remarkably, in the proposed Blockchain identity method,
each user will have a set of pseudo identities that will
remain secret for everyone else and all ledger operations
will use these identities in a non-binding way. Giving three
advantages: (i) is compliant with the right to be forgotten,
(ii) only allows to trace user actions at application level (i.e.,
for DApps) and (iii) runs on top of the existing Ethereum
networks (i.e., is compatible with Ethereum’s design and
philosophy).
The paper is structured as follows: Section II provides a
background study on PII and Blockchain. Section III intro-
duces and details our approach., Section IV describes the
main software components for this architecture. Section V
depicts how this solution is used in a case study. Section VI
describes the results and provides a discussion about them.
Finally, in Section VII the conclusions of the work are pre-
sented together with future research lines.
II. BACKGROUND STUDY
A. PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
There are several definitions and references for what consti-
tutes Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Organisations
such as NIST provides their own PII definition [16], and
they use to refer the OMB Memorandum M-07-1616 [7]
which defines PII as the information that can be used to
distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, either alone or
when combined with other personal or identifying informa-
tion that is linked or linkable to a specific individual [17].
Other definitions are generalising the concept as any infor-
mation (a) that identifies or can be used to identify, contact,
or locate the person to whom such information pertains,
(b) from which identification or contact information of an
individual person can be derived, or (c) that allows link-
ing particular personal characteristics or preferences to an
identifiable person [18]. This PII concept dates back in a
U.S. Privacy Act 1974 regulating the collection of personal
information by government agencies [19]. It is widely known
that the emergence of new powerful algorithms jeopardizes
anonimization techniques [19].
In this sense, the protection of PII is envisaged as a hot topic
and a cornerstone for any system involving personnal data.
For example, differential privacy has been used for protecting
PII in Critical Infrastructure Data [20]. This issue is not only
related to critical systems, but also to every organisation
collecting, processing, and transmiting customers’ data or
employees’ data [21], because they are becoming attractive
targets for cybercriminals.
Systems are becoming more complex and they are rely-
ing on privacy-enhancing technologies (PET), and personally
identifiable data (PID) is at the core of any PET [18]. How-
ever, PID disclosure is a risk to be managed appropriately.
In fact, in [22] authors are researching at the network traffic
level, and they are proposing a Software Defined Network-
ing (SDN) / Network Function Virtualization (NFV)-enabled
architecture for improving the efficiency of leak detection
systems. This is a similar approach to the one proposed for
identifying PII in internet traffic [23].
Therefore, PII is a research topic per se where different
methods are applied in order to minimize or to reduce the
disclosure of PID over the network.
B. BLOCKCHAIN, PII AND REGULATIONS
Since the emergence of Blockchain, several applications have
been reported and their benefits are clear. Some of these
experiences are focused on the concept of digital identities
such as [24] where authors are proposing some patterns in
this context. From a practical point of view [25], the records
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stored in a ledger can’t be altered, and therefore, Blockchain
architects must identify which data is going to be used inside
the records.
Bitcoin was originally designed for one only purpose,
i.e., to create an unfeasible double-spending resistant elec-
tronic system built over an international peer-to-peer network
where nodes running Bitcoin just relay and broadcast trans-
actions to each other following several communication rules.
In Bitcoin each user is identified by unique and personal
ID composed as the 160-bit hash of the public portion of a
public/private ECDSA keypair, and usually used encoded as
Base58 text string. More modern completely decentralized
Blockchain networks follow a similar approach to identify
users. Since Bitcoin addresses are generated from randomly
seeded numbers, it is possible, although extremely unlikely,
for two people to independently generate the same address.
More generally, the concept of Decentralized Identity
can be redefined in terms of Asymmetric Cryptography,
the Identity I of user U becomes a public-private key pair
(pubU , privU ). The pubU public key authenticates the client
C and links current operations to previously stored opera-
tions in the ledger These operations are linked using public
identifiers known as addresses that are derived from pubU.
The pubU, however, allows the user to send signed messages
identified as I.
In the context of Blockchain the so called Self-Sovereign
Identity (SSI) is gaining relevance and it is considered to be a
‘‘killer application’’ [24], especially in environments where
data security and privacy are essentials. PII is an asset for
many applications and since data is stored in decentralized
manner these applications are required to implement multi-
user system for access control to stored datasets [26], [27].
Other approaches lay on third party service accountabil-
ity [47] or early stages of the SSI proofing concept [48] to
protect attributes, but don’t take into account that the identi-
fier itself can mean a way of PII colliding with regulations.
One of the biggest challenges applying differential pri-
vacy [28] in this scenario is the identification of accurate PII
parameters. As there is no predetermined rule to declare that
the specific piece of information is counted as PII or not [28].
The extensive use of PII by social network applica-
tions (SNAs) users on the Internet has raised concerns
for privacy advocates [18], and this is applicable to
Blockchain [29]. For example, some Blockchain platforms
have beenmodified as Blockchain-based transaction process-
ing systems (TPS) [30] for the preservation of confidentiality.
The use of personally identifiable attributes constituting a
digital identity is an integral part of service transactions over
networks and identity trust is being calling in question [31].
Other research works are focused on using Blockchain as
IMS such as in [32] where a Blockchain-based Personally
Identifiable Information Management System (BcPIIMS)
is designed for PII management throughout organizations,
in [49] where attribute managed user identities are certified
and controled by authorities or in [50] for specific pre-created
and permissioned groups of users.
Another Blockchain-based solution is the EIDM
(Ethereum-based Identity Management) protocol [33]. This
new protocol solves the problem of over-reliance on third
parties in the existing identity management system solu-
tions. The performance evaluation results also indicated
that the new protocol demonstrates better practicability and
flexibility [33].
However decentralization is not the solution for PII and
there are some existing research works revealing these issues
related to privacy preservation [34].
From a regulatory point of view, governments and agencies
are stressing the PII concept, and depending on each case
the use of PII is more restrictive than others. For exam-
ple, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) [35] provides a set of rules for maintaining secure
data storage, and to safely transmit patient PII. California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) [10] grants California con-
sumers data privacy rights and control over their personal
information, including the right to know, the right to delete,
and the right to opt-out of the sale of personal information.
Aligned to this idea, GDPR also protects any user of a system
including the right to be forgotten. Our purpose is not to
describe in detail all available regulations but to describe
some of them and to highlight the fact that PII is the asset
to be protected, and there is an international trend granting
users and stakeholders the right to modify and to erase their
PII. Therefore, the use of Blockchain-based solutions should
be carefully implemented.
In order to find a balance between the benefits of
using Blockchain, regulations and stakeholders’ rights, some
authors have proposed solutions such as [36] where authors
proposed a LinkShare model using Blockchain to create a
secure, centralized, immutable and trusted data privacy mea-
surement framework.
C. ETHEREUM ACCOUNTS
Ethereum (and other Ethereum-like clients) enhances the
functionality offered by Bitcoin [37], providing the decen-
tralized Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), that can execute
scripts using a non-localized network of nodes. Those who
are owners of an Ethereum account in this decentralized
system can propose changes on the state ledger, signing
transactions with their private key and making them auditable
with their address. This need of using accounts is the base for
the proposed method.
Ethereum based technologies rely on Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). ECDSA is a pure public-key
cryptography system that is mainly used to sign and verify
messages. Ethereum based technologies implement ECDSA
using secp256k1 curve parameters. These private keys sk
and public keys pk are created as part of an Ethereum account
for every user U that wants to have an identity I on the
network.
In addition, for each I ∈ U , the address addr(U ) is
designed by the Keccak-256 hash of pk(U ), taking the last
40 characters (20 bytes) and prefixing it with 0x. addr(U ) is
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FIGURE 1. Burnable pseudo-identity account flow.
the main identifier of U when working in Ethereum and it is
used for the next set of tasks:
• Contract installation.
• Contract calling and interaction.
• Identifier for incoming transactions as part of its pay-
load.
• Identifier for account balance.
• Identifier for token trading and coins related manage-
ments.
III. THE BURNABLE PSEUDO-IDENTITY METHOD
The concept of Pseudo-Identity has been used in several situ-
ations but recently has been used together with Blockchain
approaches [38]. The concept of burnable stems from the
implementation side where tokens are burnt.
The method presented in this paper embodies the creation,
management and erasure of the burnable pseudo-identities for
a user. This method is composed by a set of different steps,
described by Figure 1:
1) Create new wallet: The first action comprises the
creation of a deterministic wallet W that represents
the burnable pseudo-identity. W consists on a set of
accounts acct along the index space with size goal
made available W = acct(i) | 0 < i < goal. Encryp-
tion mechanisms ensure that Wi, and in consequence
every accti, are unique. The access to the elements of
W is protected by a master key mk .
2) Derive new account: Each time the Blockchain net-
work needs to be reached by the user U, a new acc(Ui)
is appended to W . acc(Ui) is derived from mk and the
correspondant i and it is composed by a public key
pk(Ui), a private key sk(Ui) and an address addr(Ui).
3) Blockchain interaction: The derived acc(Ui) is
responsible for signing the transaction, and addr(Ui)
will appear in the from field when calling a Smart
Contract.
4) Bind account to digital asset: The transaction and
addr(Ui) are bound offchain, so the user can locally
decide when to destroy the pair.
5) Increment account index: When the maximum num-
ber of usages for addr(Ui) is reached, i is incremented
FIGURE 2. Identifier creation process.
(i → i + 1) to allow the selection of the next account
(enclosing addr(Ui+1)). This responds to the rotation
concept.
6) Read latest deterministic index: addr(Ui+1) is read
and prepared for the next interaction.
Keeping low the number of usages for one account reduces
the historical trace of transactions in the ledger. Although the
number of these usages can be customized, it is defaulted to 1.
This way, there is only one pair binding between each account
identifier and the user digital assets, and there is no historical
trace of transactions.
A. IDENTITY CREATION
Our approach defines the burnable pseudo-identity which
is a Web3js based implementation for representing digital
identities. The creation detailed in Figure 2 involves an initial
seed, from a secure entropy source, and a user secret. The
secret is used during the identity storage to symmetrically
encrypt it.
The process of creating an account is based on the
EthereumHD standards BIP 32 [39] and BIP 44 [40]. Follow-
ing the BIP 39, we also provide an account recovery mecha-
nism for users based on mnemonics. The real complexity of
burnable pseudo-identities lies in how identities are used to
satisfy previous legal and compliance requirements assuring
that they usage is forbidden after their lifetime period or upon
explicit user requirement.
B. IDENTITY ERASURE
The identity erasure can be requested at any time to the system
where the Burnable Pseudo-Identity Method is used. The
request may come directly from the user or caused by the
end of a service. As established by the GDPR, art. 17, ‘‘The
data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller
the erasure of personal data concerning him or her’’ [9].
When this action takes place, Data Controllers services or
DApps must ‘‘forget’’ any data related to that specific user.
As Blockchain keeps an immutable, traceable, forever grow-
ing record of the actions taken place in the network, a special
effort has been made to achieve this need.
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FIGURE 3. Circular pool of accounts with N = 8.
Technical research has been done to find the best way to
unlink PII data from the system without breaking the block
record and without rejecting the Blockchain original philos-
ophy, that would have ended in a misuse of the technology.
The solution has embraced the fact that if the system cannot
access the data, the data becomes atomic, untraceable and
anonymized.
When aData Subject sends amessagemi containing a piece
of atomic information, the Data Processor can verify that mi
has been sent by addr(Ui), but he will not be able to link mi
to any previous messages (mj | 0 ≤ j < i), since they have
been created by independent accounts (addr(Uk ) | k = j).
This assertion is also true once the relation between them is
over, because the observer can’t infer new information about
the sender (mj | i < j).
Summarizing, the dissociation between the atomic data
and the Data Subject leads to a full anonymization of the
data. The identifier rotation is a key point of the Burnable
Pseudo-Identity Method, constantly changing in a circular
array fashion.
C. ROTATION AND STORAGE OF IDENTIFIERS
At some extent, the burnable pseudo-identities are defined
as a circular array of size n – where n is the maximum
number of identities to be created and managed simultane-
ously – creating an endless pool of burnable pseudo-identities
(see Figure 3). Each pool structure is used for each DApp
or Data processor service the user wants to interact with,
so it provides full anonymization and privacy against the
ledger interaction, ledger monitoring, and simultaneous
DApp usage. When the pseudo-identities are burnt by the
user, the relationships made on the ledger between a digital
asset and a public address become irresoluble. At that point,
there is no feasible way to lookup nor recover the original
author or entity behind a transaction.
Since burnable pseudo-identities are compatible with
Ethereum identifiers, they can also be stored in an Ethereum
V3 KeyStore; an encrypted way of storing private keys used
for signing transactions. If users lose this file, users lose
access to their unique private key and to the ability to sign and
execute transactions. This process is unrecoverable unless
proper recovery mechanisms are designed.
Our current key storage mechanism requires to encode
information using at least AES-128-CTR crypto protocol
in order to store data safely in filesystem. By default, and
following conventions, keystore filenames are 128-bit
UUID given to the secret key and saved as uuid.json. These
files have an associated password chosen by the User.
To derive a given uuid.json file’s secret key, first we derive
the file’s encryption key; this is done through taking the file’s
password and passing it through a key derivation function
as described by the kdf value. KDF-dependent static and
dynamic parameters to the KDF function are described in
kdfparams value. We preset KDF (key derivation function) to
PBKDF2, being PBKDF2 kdfparams as follows:
1) prf: hmac-sha256.
2) c: number of iterations to be made in KDF routine.
3) salt: salt passed to PBKDF algorithm.
4) dklen: length for the derived key. Must be bigger than
32 bytes.
Once the file’s key has been derived, it should be verified
through the derivation of the MAC. The MAC should be cal-
culated as the SHA3 (keccak-256) hash of the byte array
formed as the concatenations of the second-leftmost 16 bytes
of the derived key with the ciphertext key’s contents. Finally,
User Identities are stored.
IV. TOOLS AND SOFTWARE COMPONENTS
The user privacy is ensured by the formulation of involved
components when interacting with Ethereum through DApps
and Data Processor services. The method works both at
client-side (for DApps running in browsers) and server-side
(for libraries running in host servers).
To achieve that objective, a design based on JavaScript
(abbreviated JS) and WebAssembly modules (abbreviated
Wasm) is suggested. Nevertheless, the method outlined in this
paper establishes the objective and the communication flow
of the components but is independent of the internal design
and implementation of each component.
The relevant components of the proposed method are Key-
gen, Account Evaluator, Account Manager and Web3 TX
Manager. Figure 4 details the relationship among them and
with other parts in the system. The Burnable Pseudo-Identity
Method is a blackbox allowing the management of privacy-
aware identities for user-centric decentralized applications.
The users will interact directly with the Burnable Pseudo-
Identitiy Method implementation to manage their accounts
and interact with the node of an Ethereum network.
TheAccountManager is themainmodule orchestrating the
flow.
1) It manages the accounts created by the Keygen, index-
ing, listing, rotating and storing them.
2) It gets the current account from the Account Evaluator.
3) It requests Web3 Tx Manager to construct the trans-
action packet, sign it with a proper burnable pseudo-
identity, and broadcast it to the network.
A. ACCOUNT MANAGER
The Account Manager ensures a proper off chain user-centric
creation and operation for the set of identities I belonging to
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FIGURE 4. Software components involved on the Burnable
Pseudo-Identity management.
a user U . The creation is attached to the Child Key Deriva-
tion Function (CKDF) that allows, assuming a local seed,
the creation of new child keys from parent keys (Upk ) but not
otherwise. And the goal is to relate the accounts owned by the
user, noted as Ui, being the index i, to those used as part of
previously committed transactions, satisfying (1) and (2).
n∑
i=1





The account creation is ruled by the defined ‘‘rotation
and storage of identifiers’’ mechanism proposed in this
manuscript.
The store function allows to store M in the account pool I
of the user U to make it recoverable as described before in
this manuscript.
The forget function performs the procedures for safe data
deletion. As the set of identifiers I is kept locally, only infor-
mation detached from the user U remains on the network
when I is removed. This function addresses the ‘right-to-
be-forgotten’, making the method compliant with current
regulations.
The rotate function performs an on-demand rotation of
I and updates the contents of the handlePools with new
identities for U. To enhance the trust model that avoids
arbitrary rotation requests, this function always requires the
direct interaction from U, providing the wallet authentication
passphrase.
The checkAvailable function returns the first available
burnable pseudo-identity. To do it, the Account Manager
checks its local state and the connections. Checking the avail-
ability ensures that the implementations based on thisMethod
will follow the Security by Design approach. If no burnable
pseudo-identity is available, checkAvailable will call rotate
function.
B. KEYGEN
Keygen is the managing component in charge of gather-
ing secure entropy values and creating strong cryptographic
accounts for end users as described by Algorithm 1.
The generate function allows to create new accounts based
on HD Wallets for the user. The process includes the gather-
ing of a secure entropy origin, formed by a []byte slice filled
with noise from a customized random cryptographic secure
source. With the entropy input, it creates the accounts that are
compliant with the EC secp256k1 Ethereum standard [41].
The function adds the required metadata M to the account,
where the minimum set ofM is: (i) key seed length, (ii) r (the
public key recovery parameter), (iii) i (the current heuristic
index) and (iv) kdfparams (explained in ‘‘rotation and storage
of identifiers’’). Each account gets encrypted (passphrase
protected) to be stored while not being used and it will be
recoverable by the user since it belongs the pool of burnable
pseudo-identities owned internally.





while k < ent_size do
entropy[k]← rnd();
end
W ← new secp256k1(entropy);
M ← {seed_length, r, i, kdfparams};
W ← add(M );
W ← encrypt(W , passphrase);
return: W;
C. ACCOUNT EVALUATOR
Account Evaluator is the component that gets and validates
the account to be used. As the validation response, a subse-
quent request is sent to the Account Manager for updating the
pool of available addresses for the given user.
The validate function performs all the tasks related to the
account address validation. It first validates whether the given
account address was created by the corresponding Account
Manager and that this address is recognized in the user local
information. After this initial validation, the Account Evalua-
tor validates whether the created burnable pseudo-identity is
not breaking the number of uses constraint (default to 1) per
account and that it is valid from a privacy point of view.
The notifyResult function notifies the result obtained from
the validation process to the Account Manager, indicating
whether it should create a new burnable pseudo-identity or
use any of the pooled ones. If the validate function rejects
the use of a requested account during the process, it will be
notified to the Account Manager. Then, the next available
account from I will be forced to be used.
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D. WEB 3 TX MANAGER
The Web3 Tx Manager is a transaction manager based on a
web3 implementation. This module is a medium to process
the details of a raw transaction, marshal them and broadcast
the ABI encoded Json-RPC messages to a selected provider.
The provider can be defined as any valid Ethereum protocol
compatible peer running an RPC listener on its backend.
Once the account has been selected and validated by the
Account Evaluator for the following transaction, the setEn-
vironment function configures the Web3 TX Manager using
those transaction parameters. The field to as the destination
address, the field from to sign the transaction, and the mes-
sage, serialized as ABI encoded payload.
The broadcast function connects with the customized
provider, fixed in the field provider, and delivers the message.
V. CASE STUDY: USE OF THE BURNABLE
PSEUDO-IDENTITY METHOD FOR PLATFORMS NOT
MANAGED BY USERS
The creation of a burnable pseudo-identity is always triggered
by a conscious action of the wallet owner. It is highly recom-
mended that the user accounts are managed locally, and that a
user controlled DApp oversees using the account and building
the transaction.
When the use case requires to delegate the user actions in
a middleware entity (e.g. a platform provider), the level of
security and privacy offered must remain the same.
In such scenarios, the provider must create, manage and
store the accounts with authorization of the users. The random
seed (as entropy source) is created by the provider and offered
as a service, but the secret for symmetric identity encryption
is only known by the user and the identity remains hidden and
securely protected while it’s not being used.
All these actions take place to ensure the compliance with
ethic requirements. One of them is the prohibition of using an
identifier after its lifetime period, so the data must be created
in a way that it can be unlinked if needed. This is the purpose
of the Burnable Pseudo-Identity Method.
The provider entity must ensure the authentication flow as
shown in Figure 5
Given a city council public service as Authoritative Server
A and a citizen as User U, it is assumed a scenario where
A delegates its permission management system in a network
based on Ethereum technology. The observation of transac-
tions in this permission network would enable a third party
to associate transactions requested from the citizen’s account
to be executed by the smart contract. For this reason, it is
possible to infer the immutable profile of the citizen, limiting
compliance with regulations.
In the proposed use case, U interacts with the system
through a frontend provided by A. This frontend is connected
to a backend A in charge of providing the service. Now, let
Burnable Pseudo-Identity Method be in charge of managing
Ethereum accounts forUwhen using A. The authentication in
A comprises the finding of the user wallet, uniquely identified
and secured in a Secure Storage module. Once the wallet is
FIGURE 5. Non-user managed authentication flow.
recovered and verified, it must be decrypted and unlocked to
allow the account usage.
When the city council is using this approach to manage the
citizen permissions, this will allow to keep the citizen identity
unknown to any observer. When U executes the right to be
forgotten the Secure Storage can safe-delete the HD wallet
belonging to U, and the only information left from U will be
isolated permissions from different accounts.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. PROPOSED ENHANCEMENTS IN IDENTITY
MANAGEMENT
The method described in this paper improves the Iden-
tity management offered by traditional of non-permissioned
Blockchains in four aspects.
1) User centric traceability. Despite of using a
Blockchain system, proposed burnable pseudo-
identities are only traceable from user point of view
due to the irreversibility of hierarchical deterministic
algorithms. Moreover, any third party that reads ledger
transactions (e.g., Ledger Explorers) will not be able to
correlate, link or build user centric analytics. This adds
an extra layer of privacy without modifying Ethereum
protocol nor codebase.
2) Right to be forgotten. When a Data Subject decides
to stop using a DApp or Data Processor service the
provider is required to erase all the PII from its platform
to ensure the compliance with legal regulations like
GDPR, CCPA or WPA. Since modifying data stored
in a Blockchain platform is not an option due to its
immutability, it is mandatory to study and design a way
to unlink the PII in a way that it is fully unrecoverable,
no matter the attack vector.
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TABLE 1. Mnemonic size reference data.
Our solution achieves this providing a circular array
for a pool of burnable pseudo-identities for each user
and forgetting them upon request. Interactions made at
a Smart Contract level to update the ledger will still
create a history over time but binding two observed
interactions from the same user will not be possible
only observing this history. Therefore, no one will be
able to link data stored in the ledger to a user once these
pseudo-identities are burnt.
3) Unlinkability. The Ethereum identities used in a
circular array have the irreversible property of
HMAC-SHA512 algorithm and CKDF functions for
both public and private keys. This allows our method to
create new child keys from parent keys but not other-
wise. Breaking a reversibility will constitute a ‘seconds
preimage’ attack [42] on PBDKF2-SHA-512 [43].
4) Privacy. Only users with proper identities will be able
to recover stored data. Currently, stored information
remains public for everyone in public Blockchains due
to the design of these networks.
It is strongly recommended to implement the Burnable
Pseudo-IdentityMethod at client-side when possible. The use
of this recommendation avoids server-side related security
breaches, like account leakage. However, in scenarios where
the workflow involves additional external entities, it is the
duty of these to guarantee a proper user data security and
privacy established by the security-by-design patterns.
B. BRUTE FORCING PROTECTION
The benefits achieved with the proposed method rely on
the practical inability to generate the exact same seed used
to generate all the identities for a user. This section gives
estimations on the strength of this claim.
Our solution follows the BIP 39 specification [44] to gen-
erate the seed needed to start creating new identities for
each user with the BIP 32 method. BIP 39 deterministically
generates seeds based on a mnemonic which is intended to be
more memorable and readable for a user than random bits.
BIP 39 states that initial entropy can only come in a few
sizes: multiples of 32 bits, between 128 and 256. Together
with a checksum (CS represents its length), this entropy is
encoded in a combination of 2048 memorable words. From
Table 1, it can be compared the mnemonic size needed for
all the possible sizes, together with the search space that an
attacker would need to traverse to look for any given entropy.
The search space varies from 5.44 · 1039 in the less secure
scenario (using a 12 word mnemonic) to 2, 96 · 1079 in the
most secure one (24-word mnemonic).
FIGURE 6. An estimation of complexity evolution to compute all possible
seed sizes.
However, the seed is not only derived from this entropy
but also from a passphrase provided by the user. The list of
memorable words and how they combine with each other
change from one client to another. In consequence, the secu-
rity and reliability of this implementation don’t vary from
other Ethereum BIP standards.
Considering the worst case (not providing a passphrase or
setting it as an empty string) and that the wordlist is known
beforehand, the Figure 6 shows the complexity required to
compute all the possible seeds in different search spaces with
commodity hardware, being tested in a workstation with an
Intel I5 and 8Gb RAM. It can be noted that the time needed to
brute-force it increase exponentially compared to the search
space length.
The computational cost required to simply brute force a
search space of N bits is already unfeasible. Since PBKDF2
can be implemented using very little RAM, it is known for
not being resistant to ASIC and GPU attacks [45].
Therefore, the combination of specialized hardware and
distributed HPC brute-force algorithms, could considerably
decrease the time needed to search any space [46].
y1 ∼ ax + b | a = 1.7835 · 10−10 ∧ b = 2.03295 (3)
Despite this, the complexity to bruteforce only one account
(see Equation (3)) with the current hardware and recovering
the original private key makes these attacks unfeasible due
to the amount of time and resources required to success,
and even in that case the Burnable Pseudo-Identity Method
would only uveil a small portion of data compared to other
approaches.
C. IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE
To summarize, a scenario has been designed to run a
test that allows to compare the performance impact on
DApp operating interactions. In the test, Alice creates new
standard Ethereum accounts each time she wants to execute a
Blockchain transaction (algorithm implementation described
in Algorithm 2).
On the other hand, Bob uses the burnable pseudo-
identities proposed in this manuscript (algorithm implemen-
tation described in Algorithm 3). Both approaches achieve the
same anonymity, ignoring that Alice will need to manage all
her accounts independently.
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while i < goal do
W[i]← addr, sk← derive(path0, i) ;
i← i + 1 ;
end
return:← W [i] | i ≥ 0 ∧ i < max;
TABLE 2. Model time comparison to create goal accounts.
The results of both algorithms show that even when the
generation of the set of burnable pseudo-identities has a
warmup stage, where accounts are derived from the initial
seed s, a maximum amount goal and a derivation path path0,
the overall result at runtime is much faster than on-demand
creation of standard Ethereum accounts. The results of this
experiment are described in Table 2, where it is evidenced
that the proposed method improves the base implementation,
allowing smoother workflows and less delays between the
account request and the generation steps.
Research has been conducted [51]–[53] to evaluate the per-
formance on Ethereum HD wallet implementations through
experiments. A go reference implementation [51] has been
selected to be compared with the results of the proposed
method. This implementation allows to make simulations
with a reference using the same programming language. The
purpose of the experiment is to challenge the previous studies
with this one and demonstrate that the anonymization of
the pseudonym environments has no negative impact on the
performance. The experiment is composed by several simula-
tions and it has been focused on evaluating the performance of
Algorithm 4: Performance Comparison Model
Result:W
let rounds← x ;
let count ← y ;
let benchtime← z ;
let W[rounds] ;
i← 0 ;
while i < rounds+ 1 do
goal← 2 i · 100 ;









while k < benchtime do
t, p, m, k←
eval(create_bpi_accounts(goal)) ;
Wtemp[l]← t, p, m ;
l← l + 1 ;
end
Wcount[j]← avg(Wtemp) ;
j← j + 1 ;
end
W[i]← avg(Wcount) ;
i← i + 1 ;
end
return:← W ;
TABLE 3. Reference measures for Ethereum HD Wallet implementation.
TABLE 4. BPI Wallet algorithm implementation measures, CPU and
memory metrics.
creating an increasing number of accounts (goal) in each sim-
ulation round. The approach has been to select different goal
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TABLE 5. Execution time, CPU and memory usage comparison results
between BPI Wallet implementation and reference HD Wallet
implementation.
FIGURE 7. Experimental elapsed time for scalar multiplication on a Kobliz
curve.
parameter values andmeasure three parameters: (i) being t the
required time to complete, (ii) p the impact on CPU and (iii)m
the memory usage. Seen in Algorithm 4, it helps to compare
the performance of the presented method (see Algorithm 3)
and the reference method (see Algorithm 2). On each round
of the Algorithm 4, the goal parameter is updated with a
goali = 2i · 100|i >= 0 pattern to increase the difficulty
of the experiment. To reduce the noise while increasing the
statistical results, the go test tool used for the simu-
lations has been tweaked with the flags -benchtime=2s
and -count=10. With the aim of making this experiment
replicable, it has been performed on a LinuxWorkstation with
an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8850H CPU@ 2.60GHz and 16 GB
RAM.
Table 3 shows the reference HD Wallet implementation
simulation results, while Table 4 shows the results of the
simulation for the proposed implementation. A comparison
made in the Table 5 reveals that the proposed method is
rewarded with performance improvements over the reference
implementation, resulting in an average of 51.24% faster in
CPU and with 50.04% less memory usage. All the tables
are presented in compliance with the Go Benchmark Data
Format [54].
The experiments have also disclosed that the improvement
ratio is limited by hardware due to the cryptographic nature
of the process. The limitation arises when random seeds
are created under heavy cryptographic operations. Figure 7
shows this limit for ScalarBaseMult over a Kobliz curve.
In the figure, Mul2 operation takes 37,62% over the total
execution time and SquareVal operation takes 33,24%
over the total execution time.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a novel manner to inter-
act with existing Blockchain networks (Ethereum) without
generating a trace which can be linked back to an identity.
By using the Burnable Pseudo-Identity Method, we allow
the user to sign his/her transactions with different Ethereum
identities which cannot be related to each other and which can
be discarded afterwards to achieve the right to be forgotten.
To the best of our knowledge, we have presented the
first solution which considers privacy regulations to make
user operations in Blockchain untraceable without interfering
with the normal operation of the underlying network nor
modifying its codebase. In contrast, this ability to keep the
traceability of its transactions is only granted to the user at
the application level. This privacy improvement is expected
to increase users’ confidence in Blockchain ecosystems and
to contribute to the adoption of Blockchain technology in
industrial use cases were the usage of personal data was
preventing them to use Blockchain to date.
The next steps of this work will focus on (i) further gen-
eralizing the solution to make it agnostic to the underlying
Blockchain framework, (ii) fostering its adoption by seam-
lessly integrating it as a module for reference Web3 imple-
mentations or submitting it as an Ethereum Improvement
Proposal1 and (iii) extending the current proposal to allow
1https://eips.ethereum.org/
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users to control their identity rotation by means of an external
application.
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